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I.

Introduction
In a 1987 Supreme Court case styled Maryland v. Garrison, defendant Garrison brought a

Fourth Amendment challenge to a warrant obtained by Baltimore police officers to search the third
floor of his apartment building located at 2036 Park Avenue. The officers intended to search the
apartment of a different tenant, McWebb, but failing to realize that the third floor of Garrison’s
building was divided into two units, they searched Garrison’s unit instead. They found drugs and
cash in violation of Maryland’s Controlled Substances Act. The Supreme Court ultimately upheld
the search – since the officer’s warrant said “3rd floor,” they had reasonably relied on its text – but
were called upon to examine the limits of a warrant’s “particularity” under the Fourth
Amendment.1
Garrison, argued almost 200 years later, connects with another Supreme Court case
originating in Baltimore, Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813). While far from
the American drug war that Garrison deals with, the historical context of Locke involves a kind of
prohibition as well. Locke began as an admiralty in rem forfeiture under American customs law.
American customs law was modeled on the British customs law imposed on the colonies prior to
the Revolutionary War. The Crown used writs of assistance, essentially broad search warrants, to
enforce the Navigation Acts, a series of customs laws for its colonies, which progressed in
complexity and severity in the decades preceding the Revolutionary War. The experience with the
writs of assistance prompted the early Americans to take care to insert the “particularity”
requirement into the Fourth Amendment that Garrison dealt with 200 years later. Searches
conducted under authority of the writs of assistance could lead to seizures of property using the in
rem forfeiture mechanism.
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Indeed, generally speaking, the Crown’s efforts to enforce its customs laws and trade
controls in the colonies played a central role in the conflict leading to the Revolution. It may have
been a little surprising to some, then, that after the Revolution the new republic adopted a similar
system of customs laws, allowing for in rem forfeiture and adopting another feature of British law,
the shifting of the burden of proof to the claimant if the government could show probable cause of
suspecting a violation of the customs law. The Locke case is about this burden shifting provision.
Locke, then, is very much a case about searches and seizures, and the standards imposed on the
agents of government who have the authority and duty to carry them out.
In modern times, much commentary has been written about the constitutionality of the use
of the in rem forfeiture procedure in the American drug war, a war that has proved to be so difficult
as to require the American government to stretch to its financial and constitutional limits to
continue to fight it. Before the modern war on drugs, or the Prohibition era, the trade embargo
implemented as an effort to stave off the War of 1812 was another kind of “zero tolerance policy”
that the United States government struggled to enforce, through the customs service. Having
entered our legal system literally through the ports, and having found footing in early cases like
Locke, the use of in rem forfeiture has spread throughout our legal system. Today there are well
over 100 statutes that authorize the use of the admiralty in rem forfeiture action to condemn and
seize property. The claimant-appellant in Locke, however, did not make any constitutional
argument.
Locke specifically stands for a weakened definition of probable cause in the context of in
rem forfeiture of a vessel seized for a violation of the customs laws, which would be enough to
shift the burden of proof to the claimant of the vessel, should one come forward. The Locke court
held that probable cause in this context means only reasonable suspicion of a violation. This
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standard, and the burden shifting provision that depends upon it, survive to this day. The question
remains whether this definition, born of necessity in enforcing trade regulations in an era of
booming trade, opportunistic merchants, and limited resources at the customs house, comports
with our modern understanding of due process.
II.

The English Colonial Customs Service
In the 17th century, Britain experienced increased prosperity from a rising merchant class

trading not only with Europe but with the British colonies. Soon, however, a colonial merchant
class was formed, too, and the colonists did not always find trade with England to be the most
lucrative or desirable. Under a mercantilist worldview, Britain believed that there was a fixed
supply of economic value. The Crown therefore realized that it should undertake to apply
mercantile principles throughout its colonial empire, directing the flow of trade so that more of the
wealth of the colonies would stay with Britain, and Britain’s manufacturing and merchant classes
could further grow.2
As early as 1621 the Privy Council passed legislation restricting colonial trade, aimed at
the thriving tobacco trade in the Virginia colony.3 By 1651 the first broad Navigation Act was
passed, affecting all of the colonies, and containing one simple regulation: only British ships
manned by British subjects would be permitted to carry raw materials from the colonies to the
mainland, and foreign ships would only be permitted to go to the colonies only if the goods and
the ship carrying them came from the same foreign port. 4 This early restrictions, however, left
ample room for colonists to continue to trade relatively freely with the world, and with each other.
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Early Colonial Smuggling
In 1660, a much more broadly and strongly worded Navigation Act was passed. The Act
of 1660 limited trade in certain enumerated goods produced in the colonies, goods of particular
importance to the success of the empire like tobacco and coffee, to British ports or ports of British
territories. Under the Act of 1660, no ships could trade with the colonies unless they were Britishowned. Foreign-made vessels trading in colonial waters would be required to attest to British
ownership. The Royal Navy was given authority to seize ships that were in violation of these
provisions.5
With the increase in regulation of colonial trade came an increase in creative circumvention
and outright illegal smuggling, beginning a pattern of colonial resistance that would continue until
the Revolutionary War. In 1663, the Staple Act patched over a loophole which allowed Britishowned ships to trade freely in non-enumerated goods with foreign ports so long as British
ownership was attested.6 After the Staple Act, only imports laden on board British ships in Britain
were allowed into the colonies. Foreign goods could reach the colonies if taken to Britain first,
unladen and duties paid, and then laden again on board ships bound for the colonies.7
By 1673 it was clear that smuggling of enumerated goods to foreign, European ports, was
occurring at a significant rate, and that, to the great surprise of the Crown, trade between the
colonies was thriving. Colonial merchants who traded with each other could bypass the customs
duties imposed in mainland ports, and this activity was not contemplated by the system of customs
regulation that England had created for the colonies. This problem was addressed by an Act of
1673 which imposed a surety bond requirement for loading enumerated goods in colonial ports,8
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ensuring that those goods would be unladen in a mainland port. Or, if the bonding requirement
was not met, Parliament required payment of duties before any enumerated goods could be
loaded.9
Also around this time, in 1671, the Crown established the first royal customs officer for
the colonies.10 Colonial governors had been trusted with the job up until this point, but were
generally seen to be ineffective, due to their allegiance to local trading interests. Because of
establishment of a customs officer, Parliament was able to use the Act of 1673 to essentially ratify
the subsuming of colonial customs oversight inside the London-headquartered English customs
service, stating explicitly in the Act of 1673 that the Navigation Acts would now be administered
by the English Commissioners of the Customs.11
Commentators speculate that the imposition of duties in this Act of 1673 shows the
beginnings of English exasperation with colonial subversion of the spirit of the Navigation Acts.12
More specifically, in the Act of 1673 can be seen the beginnings of an irreparable economic and
political rift between Old and New England. Because the New England colonies were not
geographically suited to the production of huge quantities of tobacco, coffee, or sugar, their
populations prospered by mimicking the trade activities of the English merchants. This was
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increasingly seen as a problem and source of tension, because the colonial merchants could gain
advantages over English merchants by avoiding English customs duties. 13 That these advantages
could lead to economic, and therefore, political independence from England was not lost on the
Crown. The duties therefore were most likely imposed in 1673 to curb the colonial coasting trade
that had surprised the Crown and was becoming of greater strategic concern.14
As the 17th Century wound to a close, the Crown realized that without substantial effort to
create a real machinery of civil service, the Navigation Acts would remain ineffective in the
colonies. To this end, in 1696 the British Parliament passed the last of its Navigation Acts, entitled:
“Act for Preventing Frauds, and Regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade.” This act was different
in its outlook from the previous acts. While the previous Navigation Acts had assumed social and
political unity of the colonies with the Crown, this act assumed that colonists would resist any
effort by the Crown to control colonial trade, and prescribed a program of enforcement.15
Accomplishments of the Act of 1696
In its Preface, the Act stated: “great abuses are daily committed, to the Prejudice of the
English Navigation, and the Loss of a great Part of the Plantation Trade to this Kingdom, by the
Artifice and Cunning of ill-disposed Persons.” Tightening the reigns yet again, under the Act of
1696, no goods were to be taken in and out of the colonies except in English-built and owned ships.
The Act increased the responsibilities of the colonial governors for enforcing the Navigation Acts,
requiring oaths and imposing fines on those who failed to properly administer the law. The new
law gave the commissioners of customs the power to remove the naval officer, an officer of the
port formerly under the sole authority of the governor. Though the naval officer remained under
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the authority of the governor, the commissioners were given the authority to approve or reject the
governor’s appointments to the office.
The Act of 1696 also extended to the colonies the English Act of Frauds, first passed in
1662.16 This act gave the collectors of customs broad authority to enforce the Navigation Acts,
including the power to use writs of assistance, which were general search warrants which bestowed
the right of forceful entry. The Act of Frauds shielded customs officials from the risk of personal
suit should they seize goods under circumstances later found to be unlawful. Additionally, the Act
of 1696 specified that proceeds from seizures would be split one third each between the Crown,
the Governor, and the person putting the suit into prosecution. The burden of proof in the case of
a seizure was to be on the defendant. Fines were created for the use of forged papers. A paragraph
of the Act stated explicitly that any law passed by a colonial legislature would be invalid if it was
“in any wise repugnant” to the Navigation Acts.17
The Act of 1696 became the first comprehensive system of customs laws for the colonies,
and many features were included that would be adopted by the United States after the revolution.
For the context of the Locke case and its later import, two of the features relating to seizures were
particularly important: the burden shifting provision, and the provision allowing for the splitting
of funds between the executive authorities and the party responsible for making out the case for
seizure.
The Utility of Admiralty Jurisdiction and In Rem Forfeiture
In the larger historical context, the commercial law was changing in England. The
powerful admiralty courts, which were civil law courts, lost jurisdictional territory to the common
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law courts.18 In one area, however, that of customs law, admiralty retained jurisdiction. Merchants
preferred admiralty because it was based in a civil code system of law and therefore was cognizable
to European trading partners, whereas the common law courts would have been less suitable for
dealings with the international trade community.19 The provisions allowing for the seizure of
vessels and their cargo for violations of the customs laws were central to the enforcement of the
Navigation Acts.
An action in rem is against the property itself. In rem forfeiture is as old as the Bible, and
prior to the Navigation Acts there was at least one other in rem forfeiture proceeding, that of
common law deodand.20 If an object was involved in a death, it was forfeited to the government.21
The admiralty action in rem, however, developed independently.22 An independent admiralty
action in rem developed out of necessity, and was useful to merchants and governments alike. As
international trade flourished, a common problem for administering the law was that the owner of
a vessel that was the subject of a dispute was often in a different part of the world than the vessel.
For example, many in rem actions against vessels had to do with collecting debts after
failed voyages. Proceeding in personem might have meant having to locate and obtain jurisdiction
over an individual elsewhere in the world, or it might have required bringing in personem suits
against a great number of individual owners of a vessel in order to execute a money judgment. By
proceeding in rem, the claims against a vessel could be resolved promptly and with relative ease,
at a local court.
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Thus, it was the reality of a globalizing world that lead to the development of the admiralty
action in rem as a mechanism for resolving commercial disputes related to the growing mercantile
commerce. This included disputes between merchants and the government, through the agents of
the customs service.
III.

The Revolution and the New Republic
The customs law reforms of 1764 became the final chapter in English colonial rule in

America, as the flaws of the Navigation Acts, combined with a redoubled effort by the Crown to
raise revenue by imposing customs duties on the colonies, and the increasing heavy handedness
that was required to achieve this end, stirred the colonists to revolution.
Following the Revolution, the port of Baltimore grew with the early republic, and with it
the city of Baltimore. By 1799, a comprehensive system of customs laws had been adopted for
the new republic that were in many ways very similar to the English laws before the Revolution.
Both the growth of Baltimore and the reestablishment of customs law in the United States set the
stage for the events of the Locke case.
The Rise of the Port of Baltimore
Prior to the Revolution, Baltimore was not recognized as a port of entry worthy of its own
collector of customs. The crown officially recognized a port of Chester & Patapsco and one of
Patuxent, 23 which competed for the territory containing the site where Baltimore City would be
incorporated in 1796. The logic of English mercantilism fueled the growth of Baltimore after the
Revolution. When Maryland was primarily a tobacco growing colony, the Port of Annapolis was
as good as any – growers loaded their crop onto barges which ferried the crops out to waiting ships.
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However, Baltimore, with its deep water port, its turnpike into the bread basket of western
Maryland, and the Jones Falls for hydropower, rapidly became a much more productive port than
its neighbors in Maryland, and the greatest early grain port in the country.24 Baltimore’s deep
water port could accommodate the largest commercial ships, and there was ample space for
warehouses and other port infrastructure to support huge exports of grain, lumber, iron, and foodstuffs.25 By 1799, Baltimore’s exports had increased more than seven fold in as many years, from
$2,500,000 in 1792, to $16,610,000 in 1799.26 Neither Annapolis, nor silt-plagued Joppa, both of
which had grown more quickly than Baltimore in the early days, could serve the rapidly
modernizing Maryland economy as well as Baltimore could.
The Customs Service in the New Republic
Along with growing trade in the new republic, came customs bureaucracy. The first
Customs Act was passed in 1790, and then another in 1799, referred to in Locke as the Collection
Law of March 2, 1799. The act of 1799 provided for a collector, a naval officer, and surveyor at
each of various ports of entry, located within customs service districts. Baltimore was one such
port of entry.
Sections 50 and 71 of the Collections Law of March 2, 1799 would provide the statutory
underpinnings of Locke. Section 50 reads: “No goods, wares, or merchandise, brought in any ship
or vessel from any foreign port or place, shall be unladen or delivered from such ship or vessel,
within the United States, but in open day, that is to say, between the rising and setting of the sun,
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except by special license from the collector . . . nor at any time without a permit from the collector
. . . .”
Section 71 said: “And in actions, suits, or informations to be brought, where any seizure
shall be made pursuant to this act, if the property be claimed by any person, in every such case the
onus probandi27 shall be on the claimant, only where probable cause is shown for such prosecution,
to be judged of by the Court before whom the prosecution is had.”
Between 1799 and the Locke case, which began with the filing by the Maryland Attorney
General of an information in the port of Baltimore in 1809, much would change about the nature
of early American trade, however it would be these basic provisions, in the Collection Law of
1799, that would drive Locke.
IV.

The Locke Case
Locke is about smuggling, and the historical context for this smuggling was the restrictive

trade policies, imposed not by the English colonial government, but by the Jefferson administration
in the years before the War of 1812. Britain and France had been at war for almost two decades
by the turn of the new century. This ceaseless conflict had been profitable for the young Republic,
as American merchants, including those from Baltimore, supplied both sides. This situation was
unsustainable however, and soon each of the warring powers looked to stop the flow of American
supplies to the other.
British conduct was especially infuriating to the Americans. Britain had captured 1,000
vessels and impressed 6,000 seamen in a quest to find or replace mass desertions of their own
seamen, often occurring when British vessels docked in American ports.28 It was the Royal Navy,
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however, that Britain entrusted with its survival, and in fact, with that of all free peoples.29 On the
European mainland, Napolean’s armies were unmatched. Britain saw its naval power as “the last
stay of the liberties of the world.”30 Without the Royal Navy, the British believed that Napoleon
would shortly establish a presence in America, easily putting down any resistance from the young
republic.31 The moral positioning of the Royal Navy as the guardian of free peoples made the
British hostile to the idea of neutrality, especially when neutrality aided the despot, Napoleon.32
The British belief that deserters remained subjects of the British Crown further contributed to the
unraveling of British-American relations in the years before the War of 1812.33
In the summer of 1807, the Chesapeake-Leopard affair produced a milestone in this
unraveling, and prompted a vigorous response from Baltimore. City residents wrote President
Jefferson and demanded that a stop be put to British transgressions. Before outrage resulted in
war, however, the Republicans would try to influence both the British and the French with trade
policies of their own. The increasingly aggressive policies of the warring parties, stemming from
the British “Orders in Council,” and the French Berlin and Milan decrees, imposed severe losses
on the American merchants attempting in vain to maintain their neutrality. Jefferson decided to
respond in kind with trade sanctions aimed at making both countries feel the loss of the American
wealth that had been supplying their armies.34
Jefferson’s policies created a game of economic “chicken.” Some Americans felt sure that
if deprived of American goods, the British Empire would quickly collapse.35 America needed
British and French buyers to grow its own economy just as much or more than the warring powers
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needed American raw materials and rudimentarily manufactured and processed goods. Similarly,
it was the merchant class, especially in New England where the local economy was more
dependent on trade than anywhere else, that would suffer the most from – and therefore resist the
hardest – any restraint on trade. Soon, New England was expressing that while the British and
French harassment of trade was devastating, it was better than no trade at all, and they demanded
that Jefferson’s Embargo Act, the strongest of the colonial policies, be repealed.36 As England
had learned in the previous century, it was impossible to restrain the surging colonial, and then
early American economy trade and enterprise.
The Struggle to Enforce the Embargo of 1807
President Jefferson’s first attempt had been the Non-Importation Act of 1806, which took
effect on November 15 of that year. This act was to be administered under the Collection Law of
1799. On the very first day of the Non-Importation Act, collectors began to seize goods, however,
they soon found that there were tremendous problems with the wording of the act. By December
3, 1806, President Jefferson was requesting suspension of the Non-Importation Act, perhaps
indefinitely. Diplomatic talks were still being tried at this time, but by October of 1807, it was
clear that negotiations between British Foreign Secretary George Canning, and the Jefferson
Administrations representatives, James Monroe and William Pinkney, would fail.
As with the Navigation Acts years before, some of the problems with the Non-Importation
Act were drafting problems. When Treasury Secretary Gallatin was consulted, he said that the act
was “so badly worded that it ‘will give rise to much perplexity and numerous suits.’” The
previously suspended Non-Importation Act of 1806 actually did go into effect for several months
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between December 1807 and February 1808, before being suspended again when a revised version
was passed, which was to take effect on June 14, 1808.
However, President Jefferson’s attention shifted to passing an embargo. The President
asked Congress to draft an embargo on December 17, 1807, and in only five days time, it did so.37
The Embargo Act was strict, prohibiting all departures of United States’ ships to any foreign port
or place, unless they were “under the immediate direction of the United States.” If a vessel wished
to participate in the coasting trade, traveling from one U.S. port to another, bond would be
required.38 As with the British Navigation Acts of the century prior, seizure and forfeiture of vessel
and cargo was one of the key enforcement tools provided for in the Embargo.39
Again, as might be reasonably expected of a law drafted in five days time, there were
drafting problems. These problems were compounded when examined by clever merchants
looking for any means by which to circumvent the Embargo. What followed in the first months
of active enforcement of the Embargo were a series of loopholes exploited by merchants, followed
by a series of patchwork Supplementary Acts.40
First, the coasting trade posed a much greater problem for the Embargo than anticipated.
Merchants would leave for a coasting voyage, and with improbable regularity, encounter bad
weather or other dangers at sea, and be forced to change course for a foreign port. 41 Docking at
an American port close to a foreign port might result in goods making their way into the foreign
port. Second, there were problems with the bonding requirements, and clever merchants were
often able to render these provisions ineffective. Third, the first Embargo Act failed entirely to
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address trade over land and trade coming across the Great Lakes. Similarly trade on the
Mississippi River had to be addressed in a later Supplementary Act of April 25, 1808.42
Attempts to enforce the embargo quickly became awkward and difficult for Congress, and
while only some were openly opposed to the embargo, many legislators were uncomfortable with
it. Representative Matthew Lyon of Kentucky wrote during the debate over the second
Supplementary Act that he did not like “this string of oaths, required by the embargo laws. There
[is] too much swearing. [The House is] stretching the plaster over the sound flesh, and [I fear] it
will end in gangrene.” Indeed, the fact that the struggle to enforce the embargo was reminiscent
of the fights over the failed British policies of the Navigation Acts was very apparent, and opinion
leaders at the time openly drew comparisons.43
Treasury Secretary Gallatin, who had corresponded with collectors nationwide, wrote to
Thomas Jefferson on the need to find a solution to enforcing the embargo, or in the alternative, to
concede that war with Britain was inevitable. “[T]wo principles must be adopted in order to make
[the Embargo] sufficient: 1st, that not a single vessel shall be permitted to move without the special
permission of the Executive; 2nd, that the collectors be invested with the general power of seizing
property anywhere, and taking the rudders or otherwise effectually preventing the departure of any
vessel in harbor, though ostensibly intended to remain there; and that without being liable to
personal suits. I mean generally to express any opinion founded on the experience of this summer
that Congress must either invest the Executive with the most arbitrary powers and sufficient force
to carry the embargo into effect, or give it up altogether . . . I see no alternative but war.”44
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Jefferson responded: “I did not expect a crop of so sudden and rank growth of fraud and
open opposition by force could have grown up in the United States. I am satisfied with you that if
orders and decrees are not repealed, and a continuance of the embargo is preferred to war, (which
sentiment is universal here) Congress must legalize all means which may be necessary to obtain
its end.”45
This discussion preceded the passing of the Enforcement Act of 1809, an act that sought,
once and for all, to make the embargo work by cutting off every avenue by which it could be
circumvented. To achieve this, the act granted to collectors a blanket, discretionary power to seize
property, forbid movement of vessels, and to search vessels “when there is reason to believe that
they are intended for exportation.” The collectors were granted the use of the militia, if necessary,
to prevent both the illegal departure of vessels and cargo, and to prevent and support any “armed
or riotous assemblage[s] of persons.”
When Congress debated the Enforcement Act, legislators finally touched on constitutional
issues for the first time in any of the debates related to the embargo policy. Prior debates had
centered on the local economic interests in protecting the livelihood of merchants. Many of the
constitutional issues discussed prior to the Enforcement Act presaged debates that would follow
the Locke case into modern times, concerning specifically the use of the in rem forfeiture action.
Debated issues included: (1) subordination of civilian to military authority, (2) excessive power
delegated to the President, (3) illegal search and seizure provisions, (4) Due Process concerns, (5)
infringement on the right to trial by jury, and (6) denying right to use state judicial processes.46
The impact of the Enforcement Act was swift and brief. Passed on January 9, 1809, it
lasted only until March 1, 1809, when it was repealed by Congress as a disgraced President
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Jefferson prepared to leave office.47 In the Supreme Court cases that arose at least in part from
actions taken under the Enforcement Act, Locke included, the act itself played little role because
by that time it was null and void.48
The embargo was a failure both at home and abroad. The Enforcement Act finally showed
that embargo would not work as a policy to achieve the desired result on the international stage.
There was little to no impact on Britain and France – in part because bumper crops in Europe
during 1808 had lessened the need for American goods, and also because Napolean’s “Continental
System” was reducing France’s dependence on colonial goods. After 1815, a blanket embargo
was never again used by the United States. As they would in later years under Prohibition, or
arguably under the modern drug war, Americans responded to the draconian Embargo with
widespread illegal activity, mainly smuggling along the coastlines.49 Americans opposed the
embargo violently, attacking and intimidating the collectors charged with its enforcement.50
President James Madison replaced the embargo with the largely toothless Non-Intercourse Acts,
but the country had largely by this time realized that both negotiations and trade sanctions had
failed, and war was likely on the horizon.51
The response of politicians and also the collectors of customs to the Enforcement Act and
the embargo in general, was reminiscent of the colonial response to the Navigation Acts of the
previous century. In some cases, collectors resigned rather than enforce the embargo. Many
simply refused to enforce it, or were completely ineffective in their enforcement of the embargo.52
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The Federalist political party experienced a resurgence that would have seemed improbable a few
years before.53
The In Rem Proceeding at the District Court in Baltimore
Joseph Locke’s goods, aboard the Schooner Wendell, arrived in Baltimore shortly after the
passage of the Enforcement Act of 1809, and were seized before the Embargo was repealed, on
February 23, 1809.54 Prior to sailing for Baltimore, the Schooner Wendell was loaded by Joseph
Locke at Shear’s (Locke’s) Wharf in Charleston, Boston, in December of 1808, and cleared
customs in Charleston on December 18, 1808.55 A man named William Lowes, an employee of
Mr. Locke, was questioned in Boston and stated that the goods on board the Wendell were taken
from a British Schooner, the Brisk. Also questioned in Boston was John Baker, of the firm
Dilloway & Baker, who were merchants in Boston. Mr. Baker was questioned because his name
appeared on the shipping manifest as the shipper of some of the goods. However, he testified that
he had no knowledge of the goods and that his firm had not shipped them.56

Advertisement57
The Captain of the Wendell, William Bodfish, answered in his interrogatories that the
Wendell had sailed with a coasting manifest. Capt. Bodfish stated that he did not know whether
or not the Boston collector of customs had inspected the goods aboard the Wendell closely, but
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that Mr. Locke had assured him that the shipment was legitimate. Capt. Bodfish also answered that
Mr. Locke had told him to apply to a “W Paltonstall” once in Baltimore, but that none of the
consignees had ever come to pick up their goods. He also stated that a man named George Edgar
had brought aboard two more trunks after the ship cleared customs on the 18th.58

Smugglers Take Warning!59
According to Capt. Bodfish, the Wendell set sail for Baltimore on December 30, 1808, and
arrived in Baltimore sometime before February 23, 1809.60 On that day, James H. McCulloch, the
Collector of Customs for the District of Baltimore, seized the Wendell and her goods for violations
of various customs laws, and John Gregg, a worker in the Baltimore customs house, testified that
he unloaded the goods that very day at the direction of the collector.61 On April 24, 1809,
McCulloch and U.S. Attorney for Maryland John Stevens exhibit an information in the port of
Baltimore.62
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As was stated in the information posted by the Collector of Customs, the Wendell contained
the following which were the subject of the forfeiture proceeding:
“Thirty-five Boxes and one trunk containing one Thousand and
twenty three pieces of Scotch Linen, Two Bales containing Twenty
pieces of Kersymere (sic) and ten pieces of cloths, Eight Bales
containing two hundred and thirty seven pieces of Scotch Linen,
Three cases containing fifty four pieces of Kerseymere, Two Bales
containing nineteen pieces cloths, one trunk containing twenty two
pieces Brown Scotch Linen, Two Bales containing thirty six pieces
Kerseymere (sic), nine trunks containing twelve hundred and forty
four pounds Scotch thread and thirty seven pieces Scotch Linen of
the goods and chattels of some person or persons to the Attorney
unknown.63”
The libel in rem filed by the U.S. Attorney was styled, United States v. Sundry Goods,
Wares, and Merchandize aboard the Schooner Wendell.64 Joseph Locke and a Baltimore merchant
named William French posted bond and filed a claim against the goods. They hired the firm of
Harper and Martin to try their case.65 Robert Harper and John Purviance made the initial filings
and court appearances on their behalf.66
The district court next turned to the discovery phase, issuing interrogatories, and sending
out two commissions to Boston to gather facts about the case. A Baltimore customs house
employee named Simon Crowell stated that he measured the Wendell, finding her to have one deck
and two masts, to be of about 64 feet length, 20 feet breadth, and 8 feet three inches depth, and 91
72/95 tons burthen. She was square-rigged, with no galleries, and an alligator figurehead.67 It was
also recorded that the Wendell was built in Sandwhich, Massachusetts, and that she had with her
at the time a temporary certificate of enrollment issued in Plymouth, Massachusetts. 68 Copies of
Case Papers, supra note 26, at 2. “Kerseymere” likely means “cashmere” and the spelling of this word changes
throughout the Case Papers.
64
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the Wendell’s license to participate in the coasting trade were available to the district court, as were
the papers from the customs house at Boston, that the Wendell received before setting sail for
Baltimore.69
On May 28, 1810, the commissioners who traveled to Boston filed their report. Then, on
June 13, 1810, an evidentiary hearing was held in Baltimore. Additional testimony was taken
during this hearing. Samuel Harden70 and William Baker, two merchants of Baltimore who
examined the goods on board the Wendell, gave their opinion that the goods were all of British
manufacture and would fetch a very high price due to their limited supply during the embargo. In
particular, William Baker stated that some of the cashmeres were of patterns that he had never
seen prior to seeing them on board the Wendell, but that in the months afterward, they had become
very popular.71 Another man named William Lowry stated that he believed that the goods were all
of very recent manufacture.72
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The Baltimore merchant William French was the only person who gave testimony on
behalf of Joseph Locke. French was a dry goods merchant with a storefront during the time of the
Locke case at 13 S. Calvert St., and then at 175 Market Street, 74 and 1 Lovely Lane.75 He sold
luxury goods, including high fashion textiles, and signed the bond delaying prosecution along with
Joseph Locke.76
In his testimony, French sought to explain away the irregularities of the shipment of goods
aboard the Wendell. He stated in his testimony that he had previously worked in a trading house
in Boston, and that he had seen that many goods that had been imported prior to the embargo
shipped overland for home consumption, without going through customs. Also, more than
$500,000 in goods had come in from Canada during one year that he worked in Boston, and those
had not gone through customs either. He also stated that it was his opinion that Joseph Locke had
disguised the names of the shippers and consignees on the shipping manifest in order to hide the
goods from his creditors, Mr. Locke being of “embarrassed circumstances,” at the time.77
The discovery report was filed on June 14, 1810. Having concluded discovery, the district
court heard the arguments in Locke v. United States, in its June term in 1810. Judge James Houston
decreed the goods condemned and forfeited to the United States, and filed his judgment on
September 12, 1810.78
On November 7, 1810, Robert Goodloe Harper and John Purviance again appeared in
district court along with the U.S. Attorney for Maryland, John Stephens, and filed an appeal to the
Fourth Circuit.79 Justice Samuel Chase heard their argument on January 28, 1811 in Baltimore,
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and affirmed the decision of the District Court that day. 80 Also on January 28, 2011, the parties
signed a stipulation that the goods on board the Wendell were found there on February 23, 1809,
and that the William French who executed the bond to delay prosecution of the forfeiture was the
same William French who gave deposition testimony on behalf of Joseph Locke.81
On February 4, 1811, the case record was sent to the Supreme Court.82
The Lawyers of Locke
Despite what may have been his embarrassed circumstances at the time, Locke (or perhaps
William French) had excellent legal representation. Both Harper and Martin, though the latter did
not participate in arguments in Locke, were leading members of the Maryland bar. They were also
both Federalists. Harper, having served in the South Carolina legislature during the years of
Federalist power, was skeptical of President Jefferson when Jefferson was elected. Harper
believed in a strong federal government, a strong executive, and also a strong military and navy to
protect American commerce, deter war, and earn respect abroad. 83 Martin was known as a great
enemy of President Jefferson, and the “bulldog of federalism.”84 Justice Samuel Chase, riding
circuit in the Fourth Circuit, was also a Federalist. Martin and Harper were on his legal team when
he faced impeachment in front of the United States Senate, and Martin’s successful defense is
remembered by history as helping to ensure that it would be a tenet of the American judiciary
system that judges be insulated from political attack.85
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Attorney General Pinkney, too, was a giant of the Maryland bar.86 Of Pinkney, Justice
Marshall is said to have remarked that he was “the greatest man he had ever seen in a Court of
Justice.”87 Pinkney had a close connection to Justice Chase as well – Chase was his tutor in
Annapolis when he began the study of law. Pinkney served as a diplomat during the years of the
embargo, and it was during the time of Locke, as Attorney General, that he rose to national fame
as a lawyer. Though it would by Pinkney’s indelible logic that would win over Justice Marshall
at the Supreme Court, both sides of the Locke dispute were represented by titans.
Locke at the Supreme Court
Arguments were heard at the Supreme Court on February 16-17, 1813, and the judgment
of the district and circuit courts affirmed on February 19, 1813.88
The Supreme Court’s opinion begins by recalling the counts filed in the original libel.
The libel contained eleven counts; in all there was one count under the Embargo Act, five counts
under the Non-Importation Acts, and five counts under the Collection Law of 1799.89
Next, the Court recounted a summary of the arguments of the attorneys before the
Supreme Court, made by Robert Goodloe Harper for the appellant, and Attorney General William
Pinkney for appellee the United States. Harper argued that the United States had not made out
its prima facie case under any of the counts, and so the libel was supported by insufficient proof.90
Count 50 of the Collection Law, which described forfeiture procedures, required that the United
States show probable cause that goods should be seized, and if it could do so, the burden of proof
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would shift to the claimant to prove that the goods did not violate the Collection Law. Harper
argued that probable cause meant a prima facie case, and until then, innocence was to be
presumed. Furthermore, Harper argued that the suspicious circumstances recounted by the United
States were all easily explainable, or simply not relevant.91
There were four suspicious circumstances that the parties argued over. First, there was a
small variance in the manifest. Second, fictitious names had been used for both the shippers in
Boston and the consignees in Baltimore. Many names appeared on the manifest, some of whom
were not of real persons and others of whom had no knowledge of the shipment. Third, the goods
did not have their certificates of entry which would have attested to proper importation at some
time prior to the beginning of the Embargo. Finally, the marks which appear on manufactured
goods and attest to the maker and place of origin of the goods had been rubbed off and replaced
with new marks.92
The core of the dispute between the parties was over the burden shifting provision found
in Section 71 of the Collection Law. This provision required that probable cause be shown by
the government when making out a case for seizure, and that upon such a showing, the claimant
would be required to prove that seizure would be unreasonable. Harper argued that probable
cause meant the making of a prima facie case.93 The government had failed to make this case.
The suspicious circumstances put forth by the government were simply inadequate to establish,
prima facie, the elements of the various counts of the libel that was filed. Harper argued that
without stating from what vessel, or at what time, or at what place goods were unladen, it was
simply impossible for a prima facie case to be made.94
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Attorney General Pinkney limited his argument to count four under the Collection Law,
which read:
The goods, being of foreign growth and manufacture, and subject to
the payment of duties imposed by the laws of the United States
between the 1st of May, 1804, and the day of filing the libel, were
imported from some foreign port or place to the attorney unknown,
into some port of the United States to the said attorney unknown, in
a certain vessel to the said attorney unknown, and were afterwards
and before filing the libel unladed at the said last mentioned port
from the said vessel without a permit from the proper officers of the
customs of the last mentioned port.95
Pinkney argued first that it was not necessary for the government to plead the exact time,
place, or from what vessel goods were unladen in violation of the Collections Law in order to
make out its case. It would generally be impossible to prove those circumstances, and supposing
that a confession was obtained from a smuggler but no answer given as to any of those facts, the
confession alone would be enough to convict the smuggler. That showed that time, place, and
vessel were not essential.96 Pinkney argued that Harper had the definition of probable cause
wrong.97 As proof, Pinkney pointed to the statute. If the definition of probable cause in Section
71 was to mean a prima facie case, it would have the effect of rendering that provision
meaningless. The making out of a prima facie case always results in a shifting of the burden of
proof, so there would be no reason to specifically state this burden shifting provision if that was
the meaning.98
Chief Justice Marshall’s Opinion in Locke
Neither party raised any constitutional questions about this burden shifting provision, and
Justice Marshall declined to raise them himself, proceeding in his opinion to agree with Pinkney
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and affirm the judgment of the district court and Fourth Circuit.99 Similarly, neither the Embargo
nor the Enforcement Act were discussed, as they both would have been null and void even before
the District Court heard arguments, and the first count under the Embargo Act was considered
abandoned.100
First, Justice Marshall reasoned that it was incontestable that the goods in question were
of foreign growth and manufacture, based on the evidence before the district court.101 Next, he
examined the four suspicious circumstances presented by the government, and found that they
each had merit as a basis for reasonable suspicion of a customs violation, and that together they
were greater than the sum of their parts. Justice Marshall reasoned that Locke was likely
smuggling British goods into Baltimore in violation of the Embargo, and that the fictitious names
on the manifest were meant to fool the customs officers, that the absence of evidence of legal
importation was notable, since it would have been easy to keep the certificates with the goods,
and that the removal and replacement of the marks designating the foreign manufacture of the
goods was too labor intensive of a task to have been undertaken for no reason.102
Finally, having determined that the circumstances of the arrival of the Wendell in the Port
of Baltimore were indeed suspicious enough to require exculpatory evidence, Justice Marshall
addressed the probable cause argument.103 Probable cause, he said, has a “fixed and well-known
meaning” in cases of seizure. It meant in this context “less than evidence which would justify
condemnation,” in other words, less than a prima facie case. To equate probable cause in the
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context of seizure with the making of a prima facie case would, as William Pinkney argued, render
the Collection Law meaningless.
V.

The Influence of Locke on Civil Forfeiture Law
The civil forfeiture provision in the Tariff Act of 1930, updated in 1984, reads as follows:
In all suits or actions [] brought for the for the forfeiture of any
vessel, vehicle, aircraft, merchandise, or baggage seized under the
provisions of any law relating to the collection of duties on imports
or tonnage, where the property is claimed by any person, the
burden of proof shall lie upon such claimant;
...
Provided, that probable cause shall be first shown for the
institution of such suit or action, to be judged of by the court, subject
to the following rules of proof:
...
(2) Marks, labels, brands, or stamps, indicative of foreign origin,
upon or accompanying merchandise or containers of merchandise,
shall be prima facie evidence of the foreign origin of such
merchandise.

Nineteen U.S.C. § 1615 (1984). This statute retains the customs law heritage from which civil
forfeiture entered our American legal system, but today over 100 statutes use this procedure.104
When Justice Marshall adopted the less exacting definition of probable cause, and the English
burden shifting provision that had been codified into the early Collections Law, his words were
fairly precise: “in all cases of seizure, [probable cause] has a fixed and well-known meaning.” It
was not until the 1870s that in rem seizure came to be applied in American law outside of the
context of customs law in which it had developed.105 Deodand, the common law in rem forfeiture
mechanism, was never adopted in the United States.106
When commentators write about civil asset forfeiture in the United States they usually
begin their papers with a horror story. For example, consider the account of Billy Munnerlyn, who
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spent $85,000 in legal fees spent to recover the plane he used to operate a charter service, when,
unbeknownst to him, a customer used it to transport cash from a cocaine deal. Munnerlyn got his
plane back only to find that the DEA had done $100,000 in damage. 107 Another example are the
facts behind Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). In that case, a
vessel was seized upon finding of one marijuana cigarette on board, even though the Court agreed
that the owner had done everything in his power to prevent guests from bringing contraband aboard
the vessel.
On their face, these stories leave one with a sense that an injustice has been committed;
that so great a loss of personal property cannot be offset by the benefit to the overall public policy,
of the specific enforcement action taken. So too in Locke perhaps, seen in light of the clear futility
of attempting to curtail the young republic’s burgeoning trade, and the historic failure of the
embargo policy to accomplish their noble goal of peace by means other than military might.
Commentators have specifically questioned whether the burden shifting provision of Locke
can comport with the modern understanding of due process.108 Use of in rem forfeiture has
expanded greatly since the days of Locke. Indeed, the circumstances of customs law and the
demands placed on Collectors with limited resources were a narrow set of circumstances.
VI.

Conclusion
The British customs service gave the colonies the in rem forfeiture proceeding, born of the

necessity out of growing international trade over the seas. Since the Crown used this proceeding
to restrain burgeoning colonial trade, it was not popular. However, after the Revolution, the new
republic sought fit to adopt a similar statutory in rem procedure.
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Locke was not the only case to test the degree to which the new republic would adopt the
old provisions of the old English customs law.109 Largely, the Supreme Court in the first half of
the 19th Century adopted all of the features of the old system. The circumstances of Locke
however, are unique enough to customs law to raise a question about whether or not the Court
would have intended its holding to apply so broadly outside of the context of customs law.
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Biographical Appendix A – Joseph Locke
Joseph Locke was a Boston merchant, living at times in Gloucester, Hingham, and
Boston. Locke was born February 22, 1772, and died April 17, 1838 in Boston.110 He married
Martha Ingersoll in 1795, who passed away shortly thereafter. After Martha passed, Locke
married Martha’s sister, Mary Ingersoll Foster in 1800.111 Martha was the widow of the
merchant Benjamin Foster, who she had married in 1795, and with whom she had two children,
William Vincent, who died at sea off the coast of Africa in 1817, and Ann Maria, who married a
Thomas Wells and was a writer of some note.112
Joseph Locke and Mary Ingersoll Foster had seven children together, including Frances
Sargent Locke, also a noted early American author, who married the painter Samuel Osgood.
She is known for having exchanged flirtatious poems with Edgar Allen Poe.113 Locke’s firstborn
son, Andrew Aitchison Locke, was part of the “infamous” Harvard Class of 1823,114 many of
whom were expelled on the eve of graduation for rioting.115
Locke was a New England merchant extensively engaged in the fish trade.116 It was said
that he was a man of “much energy and great business talents.117” A newspaper account of Locke
at the time of the seizure of the Wendell stated that Mr. Locke had at least five other vessels
engaged in smuggling in the coasting trade.118
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Locke kept a warehouse at No.8, Shear’s Wharf, sometimes referred to as Locke’s
Wharf.119 Today, Locke’s Wharf is known as Pier 9 of the Charleston Navy Yard.120

Pier 9 of Charleston Naval Yard, originally known as Shear Wharf.121
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